Are time preference and risk preference associated with cognitive intelligence and emotional intelligence?

The authors investigated whether cognitive intelligence (intelligence quotient [IQ]) and emotional intelligence (emotional quotient [EQ]) meaningfully correlate with time preference and risk preference, finding solid evidence in support. In the realm of time preference, high-EQ individuals are less subject to present (or future) bias and more patient. Further, high-IQ subjects tend to exhibit preferences that conform to expected utility maximization. While recent research on the relationship between cognitive ability and preferences has provided important insights, the results suggest that both cognitive intelligence and emotional intelligence matter

Strategies used as spectroscopy of financial markets reveal new stylized facts

We propose a new set of stylized facts quantifying the structure of financial markets. The key idea is to study the combined structure of both investment strategies and prices in order to open a qualitatively new level of understanding of financial and economic markets. We study the detailed order flow on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange of China for the whole year of 2003. This enormous dataset allows us to compare (i) a closed national market (A-shares) with an international market (B-shares), (ii) individuals and institutions and (iii) real investors to random strategies with respect to timing that share otherwise all other characteristics. We find that more trading results in smaller net return due to trading frictions. We unveiled quantitative power laws with non-trivial exponents, that quantify the deterioration of performance with frequency and with holding period of the strategies used by investors. Random strategies are found to perform much better than real ones, both for winners and losers. Surprising large arbitrage opportunities exist, especially when using zero-intelligence strategies. This is a diagnostic of possible inefficiencies of these financial markets.Comment: 13 pages including 5 figures and 1 tabl

Overconfidence in Labor Markets

This chapter reviews how worker overconfidence affects labor markets. Evidence from psychology and economics shows that in many situations, most people tend to overestimate their absolute skills, overplace themselves relative to others, and overestimate the precision of their knowledge. The chapter starts by reviewing evidence for overconfidence and for how overconfidence affects economic choices. Next, it reviews economic explanations for overconfidence. After that, it discusses research on the impact of worker overconfidence on labor markets where wages are determined by bargaining between workers and firms. Here, three key questions are addressed. First, how does worker overconfidence affect effort provision for a fixed compensation scheme? Second, how should firms design compensation schemes when workers are overconfident? In particular, will a compensation scheme offered to an overconfident worker have higher-or lower-powered incentives than that offered to a worker with accurate self-perception? Third, can worker overconfidence lead to a Pareto improvement? The chapter continues by reviewing research on the impact of worker overconfidence on labor markets where workers can move between firms and where neither firms nor workers have discretion over wage setting. The chapter concludes with a summary of its main findings and a discussion of avenues for future research

Are pension fund managers overconfident?

Empirical studies show that people tend to be overconfident about the precision of their knowledge, leading to miscalibration. Consistent with this, we found that on overage the decision makers of Swiss pension plans provide too narrow confidence intervals when asked to estimate the past return of various assets. Their confidence intervals are also systematically too narrow in their forecast of future returns, in comparison with the historical volatility. They are less miscalibrated, however, than our laymen sample. Individual differences between the participants’ degree of overconfidence are large and stable across those two different tasks. In a linear regression model we present evi-dence that miscalibration is linked to individual characteristics. In our sample younger people with an education from university and with more experience in finance or pension plans are less over-confident than older people without such an education and with less experience